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This chapter argues that the folk-psychological model of the person and
responsibility is not challenged by determinism in general or by neurodeterminism in particular. Until science conclusively demonstrates that
human beings cannot be guided by reasons and that mental states play no
role in explaining behavior, the folk-psychological model of responsibility
is justiﬁed. This chapter discusses the motivations to turn to science to
solve the hard normative problems the law addresses, as well as the law’s
psychology and its concepts of the person and responsibility. Then
it considers the general relation of neuroscience to law, which
I characterize as the issue of “translation.” The limits of neurolaw are
canvassed and the chapter argues that neurolaw poses no radical challenge to the concepts of the person and responsibility. The chapter is
cautiously optimistic about the contribution that neuroscience may make
to law in the near and intermediate term. The penultimate section
examines some of the claims concerning responsibility made in other
chapters in this volume followed by a brief conclusion.
Introduction

In a 2002 editorial published in The Economist (2002), the following
warning was given: “Genetics may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy,
make society homogeneous and gut the concept of human nature. But
neuroscience could do all of these things ﬁrst.” But neither genetics nor
any other science that was predicted to revolutionize the law, including
behavioral psychology, sociology, and psychodynamic psychology, to
name but a few, has had this effect. This will also be true of neuroscience,
which is simply the newest science on the block. Neuroscience is not
going to do the terrible things The Economist fears, at least not in the
foreseeable future. Neuroscience has many things to say, but not nearly
251
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as much as people who want to change the legal system would hope,
especially in relation to criminal law.
In a series of articles and book chapters (Morse, 2004, 2006a, 2006b,
2007a, 2007b, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c),
I argue that the new cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience poses
no fundamental challenge to the coherence of the doctrines and practices
of criminal responsibility. Moreover, at present, the new neuroscience
suggests no speciﬁc doctrinal reforms and has little role, if any, to play in
the adjudication of criminal cases. At most, in the near to intermediate
term, neuroscience may make modest contributions to legal policy and
case adjudication. Although there have been major advances in neuroscience since I began the series, the conclusions I reached about the legal
implications are entirely unchanged. Thus, there will inevitably be a great
deal of overlap between this chapter and my previous writing on the topic
because I have achieved a settled understanding about the relation
between law and neuroscience. Until there are conceptual or scientiﬁc
breakthroughs that will cast doubt on this understanding – and there
well may be such breakthroughs – for now this is my story and I am
sticking to it.
There is a problem about free will, but not in the law. The genuine
problem of free will is metaphysical and often spawns confusion.
Roughly, it refers to whether human beings possess the ability or power
to act uncaused by anything other than themselves, which is referred to as
libertarian freedom of the will. The importance of having this power or
ability results from the controversial belief that it underwrites the possibility of holding people genuinely responsible. Solving the free will
problem would have profound implications for responsibility doctrines
and practices, but, at present, the problem plays no proper role in the law
and neuroscience cannot solve it in any case. Criminal law addresses
problems genuinely related to responsibility, including consciousness,
the formation of mental states such as intention and knowledge, the
capacity for rationality, and compulsion, but it never addresses the
presence or absence of libertarian free will. Indeed, if criminal responsibility is properly understood, libertarian free will is not even
foundational.
The new neuroscience has spawned a new generation of free will
skeptics, not all of whom suffer from Brain Overclaim Syndrome
(although most do), and most of whom wrongly believe that the discoveries of neuroscience entail consequentialism. Many of these claims
suffer from confusions, however. Either the skeptics are preaching to
the choir about libertarian freedom because almost no one believes that
human beings possess such god-like powers, or they have failed
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sufﬁciently to respond to compatibilist accounts of responsibility that do
not require libertarian freedom. Often, people in the latter group have
not clearly identiﬁed what they mean by free will. In the words of the
philosopher, Manuel Vargas (2013), the debate about free will has been
bedeviled by “troubled, fragmented” thinking about the problem.
The central thesis of this chapter is that the folk-psychological model of
the person that is central to our explanations of human behavior and to
responsibility doctrines and practices is not challenged by determinism in
general or by neurodeterminism in particular. Criminal responsibility
doctrines and practices are fully compatible with the truth of determinism (or causal closure). Until science conclusively demonstrates that
human beings are not responsive to and cannot be guided by reasons
and that mental states do not play even a partial causal role in explaining
behavior, the folk-psychological model of responsibility will endure as
fully justiﬁed. Scientiﬁc ﬁndings, whether from neuroscience or other
sciences, will be useful only if they help elucidate the law’s folkpsychological criteria. This claim does not “wall off” the law’s responsibility practices from science. Rather, it simply requires that the scientiﬁc
data be translated into the law’s folk-psychological criteria. As the eminent forensic psychiatrist Phillip Resnick says generally about legally
relevant behavior: “You need to understand why. And you can’t see
why on an fMRI” (quoted in Doherty, 2007).
This chapter ﬁrst addresses the law’s motivation and the motivation of
some advocates to turn to science to solve the very hard normative
problems that law addresses. The next section discusses the law’s psychology and its concepts of the person and responsibility. Then it considers
the general relation of neuroscience to law, which I characterize as the
issue of “translation.” The following section canvasses various distractions that have bedeviled clear thinking about the relation of scientiﬁc,
causal accounts of behavior to responsibility. Next, it examines the limits
of neurolaw and considers why neurolaw does not pose a genuinely
radical challenge to the law’s concepts of the person and responsibility.
The chapter then makes a case for cautious optimism about the contribution that neuroscience may make to law in the near and intermediate
term. The penultimate section examines some of the claims concerning
responsibility made by other chapters in this volume. A brief conclusion
follows.
The source of neuroexuberance
Everyone understands that legal issues are normative, addressing how we
should regulate our lives in a complex society. How do we live together?
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What are the duties we owe each other? For violations of those duties,
when is the state justiﬁed in imposing the most afﬂictive – but sometimes
justiﬁed –— exercises of state power, criminal blame, and punishment?
When should we do this, to whom, and how much?
Virtually every legal issue, including the criteria for criminal responsibility, is contested, and there is always room for debate about policy,
doctrine, and adjudication. In a recent book, Professor Robin Feldman
has argued that law lacks the courage forthrightly to address the difﬁcult
normative issues that it faces (2009). The law therefore adopts what
Feldman terms an “internalizing” and an “externalizing” strategy for
using science to try to avoid the difﬁculties. In the internalizing strategy,
the law adopts scientiﬁc criteria as legal criteria. A futuristic example
might be using neural criteria for criminal responsibility. In the
externalizing strategy, the law turns to scientiﬁc or clinical experts to
make the decision. An example would be using forensic clinicians to
decide whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial and then
simply rubberstamping the clinician’s opinion. Neither strategy is successful because each avoids facing the hard questions and impedes legal
evolution and progress. Professor Feldman concludes, and I agree, that
the law does not err by using science too little, as is commonly claimed.
Rather, it errs by using it too much because the law is too insecure about
its resources and capacities to do justice.
A fascinating question is why so many enthusiasts seem to have
extravagant expectations about the contribution of neuroscience to
law, especially criminal law. Here is my speculation about the source.
Many people intensely dislike the concept and practice of retributive
justice, thinking that they are prescientiﬁc and harsh. Their hope is that
the new neuroscience will convince the law at last that determinism is
true, no offender is genuinely responsible, and the only logical conclusion is that the law should adopt a consequentially based prediction/
prevention system of social control guided by the knowledge of the
neuroscientist-kings who will ﬁnally have supplanted the platonic
philosopher-kings (e.g., Greene & Cohen, 2006). On a more modest
level, many advocates think that neuroscience may not revolutionize
criminal justice, but neuroscience will demonstrate that many more
offenders should be excused and do not deserve the harsh punishments
imposed by the United States criminal justice system. Four decades ago,
our criminal justice system would have been using psychodynamic
psychology for the same purpose. More recently, genetics has been
employed in a similar manner. The impulse, however, is clear: jettison
desert, or at least mitigate judgments of desert. As will be shown below,
however, these advocates often adopt an untenable theory of mitigation
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Criminal law presupposes a “folk-psychological” view of the person and
behavior. This psychological theory explains behavior in part by mental
states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, willings, and plans. Biological
and other psychological and sociological variables also play a causal role,
but folk psychology considers mental states fundamental to a full causal
explanation and understanding of human action. Lawyers, philosophers,
and scientists argue about the deﬁnitions of mental states and theories of
action, but that does not undermine the general claim that mental states
are fundamental. Indeed, the arguments and evidence that disputants
use to convince others presuppose the folk-psychological view of the
person. Brains do not convince each other, people do. Folk psychology
presupposes only that human action will at least be rationalizable by
mental state explanations or will be responsive to reasons – including
incentives – under the right conditions.
For example, the folk-psychological explanation for why you are reading this chapter is, roughly, that you desire to understand the relation of
neuroscience to criminal responsibility or to law generally. You believe
that reading the chapter will help fulﬁll that desire, so you formed the
intention to read it. This is a practical, rather than a deductive, syllogism.
Brief reﬂection should indicate that the law’s psychology must be a folkpsychological theory, a view of the person as a conscious – and potentially
self-conscious – creature who forms and acts on intentions that are the
product of the person’s other mental states. We are the sort of creatures
who can act for and respond to reasons. The law treats persons generally
as intentional creatures and not simply as mechanistic forces of nature.
Law is primarily action-guiding and is not able to guide people directly
and indirectly unless people are capable of using rules as premises in their
reasoning about how they should behave. Unless people could be guided
by law, including by the law’s inﬂuence on the formation of character and
habits, it would be useless (and perhaps incoherent) as an action-guiding
system of rules. Legal rules are action-guiding primarily because these
rules provide an agent with good moral or prudential reasons for forbearance or action. Human behavior can be modiﬁed by means other than
inﬂuencing deliberation, and human beings do not always deliberate
before they act. Nonetheless, the law presupposes folk psychology even
when we most habitually follow the legal rules. Unless people are capable

Comp. by: AbdulMalik Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 13
Date:25/4/15 Time:18:55:40 Page Number: 256

256

Title Name: Glannon

Stephen J. Morse

PR

O

O

F

of understanding and then using legal rules to guide their conduct, the
law is powerless to affect human behavior.
The legal view of the person does not hold that people must always
reason or consistently behave rationally according to some preordained,
normative notion of rationality. Rather, the law’s view is that people are
capable of acting for reasons and are capable of minimal rationality
according to predominantly conventional, socially constructed standards. The type of rationality the law requires is the ordinary person’s
common-sense view of rationality, not the technical notion that might be
acceptable within the disciplines of economics, philosophy, psychology,
computer science, and the like.
Virtually everything for which agents deserve to be praised, blamed,
rewarded, or punished is the product of mental causation and, in
principle, is responsive to reasons, including incentives. Machines may
cause harm, but they cannot do wrong, and they cannot violate expectations about how people ought to live together. Machines do not deserve
praise, blame, reward, punishment, concern, or respect because they
exist or because they cause results that change the world. Only people,
intentional agents with the potential to act, can do wrong and violate
expectations of what they owe each other.
Many scientists and some philosophers of mind and action might
consider folk psychology to be a primitive or prescientiﬁc view of human
behavior. For the foreseeable future, however, the law will be based on
the folk-psychological model of the person and behavior described. Until
and unless scientiﬁc discoveries convince us that our view of ourselves is
radically wrong, the basic explanatory apparatus of folk psychology will
remain central. It is vital that scientiﬁc critics of the criminal law should
understand that claims that our responsibility practices are not coherent
and justiﬁed can only be demonstrated by showing that agency is an
illusion. But as long as we have reason to believe, as we most assuredly do
(Fodor, 1989; and see below), that human beings have the capacity to be
guided by reason – a capacity fully consistent with the truth of determinism – neuroscience poses no general challenge to our responsibility
doctrines and practices. If neuroscience is to have appropriate inﬂuence
on current criminal law and legal decision-making, the science must be
relevant to and translated into the law’s folk-psychological framework.
Criminal responsibility doctrines
All of the law’s doctrinal criteria for criminal responsibility are folkpsychological. Let us begin with the deﬁnitional criteria, the “elements”
of crime. The “voluntary” act requirement is deﬁned, roughly, as an
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intentional bodily movement – or omission in cases in which the person
has a duty to act – done in a reasonably integrated state of consciousness.
Other than crimes of strict liability, all crimes also require a culpable
mental state, such as purpose, knowledge, or recklessness. All afﬁrmative
defenses of justiﬁcation and excuse involve an inquiry into the person’s
mental state, such as the belief that self-defensive force was necessary or
the lack of knowledge of right from wrong.
Our folk-psychological concepts of criminal responsibility follow logically from the action-guiding nature of law itself, from its folk-psychological concept of the person and action, and from the aim of achieving
retributive justice, which holds that no one should be punished unless
they deserve it and no more than they deserve. The general capacity for
rationality is the primary condition for responsibility, and the lack of that
capacity is the primary condition for excusing a person. If human beings
were not rational creatures who could understand the good reasons for
action and were not capable of conforming to legal requirements through
intentional action or forbearance, the law could not adequately guide
action and would not be just. Legally responsible agents are therefore
people who have the general capacity to grasp and be guided by good
reason in particular legal contexts (Wallace, 1994, considering responsibility generally).
In cases of excuse, the agent who has done something wrong acts for a
reason but is either incapable of rationality generally or incapable on the
speciﬁc occasion in question. This explains, for example, why young
children and some people with mental disorders are not held responsible.
The amount of lack of capacity for rationality that is necessary to ﬁnd the
agent not responsible is a moral, social, political, and, ultimately, legal
issue. It is not a scientiﬁc, neuroscientiﬁc, medical, psychological, or
psychiatric issue.
Compulsion or coercion is also an excusing condition. Literal compulsion exists when the person’s bodily movement is a pure mechanism that
is not rationalizable by reference to the agent’s mental states. These cases
defeat the requirement of a “voluntary act.” For example, a tremor or
spasm produced by a neurological disorder is not an action because it is
not intentional and, therefore, defeats the ascription of a voluntary act.
Metaphorical compulsion exists when an agent acts intentionally but in
response to some hard choice imposed on the agent through no fault of
his or her own. For example, if a miscreant holds a gun to an agent’s head
and threatens to kill her unless she kills another innocent person, it would
be wrong to kill under these circumstances. Nevertheless, the law may
decide as a normative matter to excuse the act of intentional killing
because the agent was motivated by a threat so great that it would be
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supremely difﬁcult for most citizens to resist. Cases involving internal
compulsive states are more difﬁcult to conceptualize because it is difﬁcult
to deﬁne and assess “loss of control” (Morse, 1994, 2002, 2011a). The
cases that most ﬁt this category are “disorders of desire,” such as addictions and sexual disorders. The question is why these acting agents lack
control, but other people with strong desires do not. If an agent frequently yields to his or her apparently very strong desires at great social,
medical, occupational, ﬁnancial, and legal cost, the agent will often say
or observers will infer the agent was “out of control,” and an excuse or
mitigation is therefore warranted. But why mitigation or excuse should
obtain is difﬁcult to understand.
All the distinctions criminal responsibility criteria draw – act/no act;
culpable mental state/no culpable mental state; rational capacity/lack of
rational capacity; compulsion/no compulsion – are consistent with
retributive and consequential theories of just blame and punishment that
we endorse and with the truth of determinism. For example, a person
whose bodily movement is a spasm that causes harm does not deserve
blame and punishment for the harm because the spasm was not the
agent’s action and such harms cannot be deterred by the action-guiding
function of the criminal law. Now assume that determinism is true. It is
simply also true that some bodily movements are actions and others are
not; that some people form culpable mental states and others don’t; that
some people commit crimes while they are psychotic and most other
people who commit crimes are not psychotic; and that some people
commit crimes because they are threatened with death or grievous bodily
harm if they don’t commit the crime and most other people who commit
crimes are not so threatened. Wittgenstein famously asked: “when
‘I raise my arm’, my arm goes up. And the problem arises: what is left
over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my
arm?” (1991, para. 621). This is the question of agency. To dismantle
this folk-psychological structure, neuroscience would have to demonstrate that the bodily movement produced by a muscular spasm and an
identical movement that was intentional are indistinguishable metaphysically or should be treated morally the same. Neuroscience does not
remotely indicate the former and it is the naturalistic fallacy to claim that
it can do the latter.
Lost in translation? Legal relevance and the need
for translation
What in principle is the possible relation of neuroscience to law? We
must begin with a distinction between internal relevance and external
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relevance. An internal contribution or critique accepts the general coherence and legitimacy of a set of legal doctrines, practices, or institutions
and attempts to explain or alter them. For example, an internal contribution to criminal responsibility may suggest the need for doctrinal
reform of, say, the insanity defense, but it would not suggest that the
notion of criminal responsibility is itself incoherent or illegitimate. By
contrast, an externally relevant critique suggests that the doctrines, practices or institutions are incoherent, illegitimate, or unjustiﬁed. Because a
radical, external critique has little possibility of success at present (as is
explained below), I make the simplifying assumption that the contributions of neuroscience will be internal and thus will need to be translated
into the law’s folk-psychological concepts.
As we have seen, the law’s criteria for responsibility and competence
are essentially behavioral – acts and mental states. The criteria of
neuroscience are mechanistic – neural structure and function. Is the
apparent chasm between those two types of discourse bridgeable? This
is a familiar question in the ﬁeld of mental health law (Stone, 1984), but
there is even greater dissonance in neurolaw. Psychiatry and psychology
sometimes treat behavior mechanistically, sometimes treat it folkpsychologically, and sometimes blend the two. Neuroscience, in contrast, is purely mechanistic and eschews folk-psychological concepts and
discourse. Neurons and neural networks do not act intentionally for
reasons. They have no sense of past, present, and future, and no aspirations. They do not recognize that they will die. Thus, the gap will be
harder to bridge.
The brain does enable the mind (even if we do not know how this
occurs). Therefore, facts we learn about brains in general or about a
speciﬁc brain could, in principle, provide useful information about
mental states and about human capacities in general and in speciﬁc cases.
Some believe that this conclusion is a category error (Bennett & Hacker,
2003; Pardo & Patterson, 2013). This is a plausible view, and perhaps it
is correct. If it is, then the whole subject of neurolaw is empty, and there
was no point writing this chapter in the ﬁrst place. Let us therefore
bracket this pessimistic view and determine what follows from the more
optimistic position that what we learn about the brain and nervous
system can be potentially helpful to resolving questions of criminal
responsibility if the ﬁndings are properly translated into the law’s psychological framework.
The question is whether the new neuroscience is legally relevant
because it makes a proposition about responsibility or competence more
or less likely to be true. Any legal criterion must be established independently, and biological evidence must be translated into the criminal law’s
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This section considers a number of related issues that are often thought
to be relevant to criminal responsibility but that are in fact irrelevant,
confusing, and distracting: free will, causation as an excuse, causation as
compulsion, prediction as an excuse, dualism, and the non-efﬁcacy of
mental states. It is important to correct these errors because much of the
unjustiﬁed legal exuberance about the contributions of neuroscience ﬂow
from them. The legal exuberance also ﬂows, however, from unrealistic
expectations about the scientiﬁc accomplishments of neuroscience. The
next section of this chapter addresses the scientiﬁc exuberance.
Contrary to what many people believe and what judges and others
sometimes say, free will in the strong sense of metaphysical libertarian
freedom is not a legal criterion that is part of any doctrine, and it is not
even foundational for criminal responsibility (Morse, 2007b). As discussed above, criminal law doctrines are fully consistent with the truth
of determinism or universal causation that allegedly undermines the
foundations of responsibility and they are consistent with moral and legal
theories of responsibility and justice that we have reason to endorse.
Criminal law addresses folk-psychological issues genuinely related to
responsibility, including consciousness, the formation of mental states
such as intention and knowledge, the capacity for rationality, and compulsion. But the law never addresses the presence or absence of free will
understood as libertarian freedom.
When most people use the term “free will” in the context of legal
responsibility, they are typically using it loosely as a synonym for the
conclusion that the defendant was or was not criminally responsible.
They typically have reached this conclusion for reasons that do not
involve free will – for example, that the defendant was legally insane or
acted under duress – but such use of the term free will only perpetuates
misunderstanding and confusion. Once the legal criteria for excuse have
been met – and no excuse includes lack of free will as a criterion – the
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defendant will be excused without any reference whatsoever to free will
as an independent ground for excuse.
There is a genuine metaphysical problem regarding free will, which is
whether human beings have the capacity to act uncaused by anything
other than themselves and whether this capacity is a necessary foundation
for holding anyone legally or morally accountable for criminal conduct.
Philosophers and others have debated these issues in various forms for
millennia. This is a philosophical issue, but it is not a problem for the
law, and neuroscience raises no new challenge to this conclusion. Solving
the free will problem would have profound implications for responsibility
doctrines and practices, such as blame and punishment, but having or
lacking libertarian freedom is not a criterion of any civil or criminal law
doctrine.
The majority of experts on this question are “compatibilists,” people
who think that responsibility is genuinely possible even if determinism is
true. Contrary to what philosophically naïve critics may think, compatibilism is not an illusion or sleight of hand deﬁnitional trick, it does not
presuppose substance dualism, and it has powerful moral and metaphysical support (e.g., Vihvelin, 2013). Admittedly, there is no resolution in
sight for the metaphysical problem, but compatibilism cannot simply be
waved away. Its arguments must be met by responsibility skeptics who
can try to show either that it is metaphysically unsound or that the model
of the person and freedom it presupposes – roughly, a reasons-responsive
creature like us – is simply wrong as a scientiﬁc matter. If the arguments
cannot be successfully met – and I believe they cannot be at present or for
the foreseeable future – the responsibility skeptic would do well to accept
the more limited conception of freedom that compatibilist responsibility
adopts, especially given the importance to our moral and social lives of
responsibility practices.
In short, neuroscience is simply the most recent, mechanistic causal
science that appears deterministically to explain behavior. Neuroscience
thus joins social structural variables, behaviorism, genetics, and other
scientiﬁc explanations that have also been deterministic explanations for
behavior. In principle, however, neuroscience adds nothing new, even if
neuroscience is a better, more persuasive science than some of its predecessors. No science, including neuroscience, can demonstrate that libertarian free will does or does not exist. As long as free will in the strong
sense is not foundational for just blame and punishment and is not a
criterion at the doctrinal level – which it is not – the truth of determinism
or universal causation poses no threat to legal responsibility. Neuroscience may help shed light on folk-psychological excusing conditions, such
as automatism or legal insanity, but the truth of determinism is not an
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excusing condition. The law will be fundamentally challenged only if
neuroscience or any other science can conclusively demonstrate that the
law’s psychology is wrong, and that we are not the type of creatures for
whom mental states are causally effective. This is a different question
from whether determinism undermines responsibility, however, and this
article returns to the more radical challenge below.
A related confusion is that behavior is excused if it is caused, but
causation per se is not a legal or moral mitigating or excusing condition.
I termed this confusion the “fundamental psycholegal error” (Morse,
1994). At most, causal explanations can only provide evidence concerning whether a genuine excusing condition, such as lack of rational capacity, was present. For example, suppose a life marked by poverty and
abuse played a predisposing causal role in a defendant’s criminal behavior or that an alleged new mental syndrome played a causal role in
explaining criminal conduct. The claim is often made that such causes –
for which the agent is not responsible – should be an excusing or
mitigating position per se, but this claim is false.
All behavior is the product of the necessary and sufﬁcient causal
conditions without which the behavior would not have occurred, including brain causation, which is always part of the causal explanation for any
behavior. If causation were an excusing condition per se, then no one
would be responsible for any behavior. Some people might welcome such
a conclusion and believe that responsibility is impossible, but this is not
the legal and moral world we inhabit. The law holds most adults responsible for most of their conduct, and genuine excusing conditions are
limited. Thus, unless the person’s history or mental condition, for
example, provides evidence of an existing excusing or mitigating condition, such as lack of rational capacity, there is no reason for excuse or
mitigation.
Even a genuinely abnormal cause is not per se an excusing condition.
For example, imagine an armed robber who suffers from intermittent
hypomania and who robs only when clinically hypomanic because only
then does he or she feel sufﬁciently energetic and conﬁdent. In other
words, the hypomania is a “but for” cause of these robberies. Nevertheless, the robber would not be excused for an armed robbery because
hypomania seldom compromises rational capacity sufﬁciently to warrant
an excuse. If an armed robbery were committed under the inﬂuence of a
delusional belief the robber’s mania produced, then he or she might be
excused by reason of legal insanity. In that case, the excusing condition
would be compromised rationality and not the mania per se. In short, a
neuroscientiﬁc causal explanation for criminal conduct, like any other
type of causal explanation, does not per se mitigate or excuse. It only
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provides evidence that might help the law resolve whether a genuine
excuse existed, or it may in the future provide data that might be a guide
to prophylactic or rehabilitative measures.
Compulsion is a genuine mitigating or excusing condition, but causation –including brain causation – is not the equivalent of compulsion.
Compulsion may be either literal or metaphorical and normative. It is
crucial to recognize that most human action is not plausibly the result of
either type of compulsion, but all human behavior is caused by its
necessary and sufﬁcient causes – including brain causation. Even abnormal causes are not necessarily compelling. To illustrate, suppose that a
person has weak pedophilic urges and weak sexual urges in general. If
this person molested a child, there would be no ground for a compulsion
excuse. If causation was the equivalent of compulsion, all behavior would
be compelled and no one would be responsible. Once again, this is not a
plausible account of the law’s responsibility conditions. Causal information from neuroscience might help us resolve questions concerning
whether legal compulsion existed, or it might be a guide to prophylactic
or rehabilitative measures when dealing with plausible legal compulsion.
Causation, however, is not per se compulsion.
Causal knowledge, whether from neuroscience or any other science,
can enhance the accuracy of behavioral predictions, but predictability is
also not a per se excusing or mitigating condition – even if the predictability of the behavior is perfect. To understand this, consider how many
things we do that are perfectly predictable but for which there is no
plausible excusing or mitigating condition. If the variables that enhance
prediction also produce a genuine excusing or mitigating condition, then
excuse or mitigation is justiﬁed for the latter reason and independent of
the prediction.
For example, recent research demonstrates that a history of childhood
abuse coupled with a speciﬁc, genetically caused enzyme abnormality
that produces a neurotransmitter deﬁcit vastly increases the risk that a
person will behave antisocially as an adolescent or young adult (Caspi
et al., 2002). Does this mean that an offender with this gene by environment interaction is not responsible or less responsible? No. The offender
may not be fully responsible or responsible at all, but not because there is
a strong but partial causal explanation. What is the intermediary excusing
or mitigating principle? Are these people, for instance, more impulsive?
Are they lacking rationality? What is the actual excusing or mitigating
condition?
Again, causation is not compulsion, and predictability is not an excuse.
Just because an offender is caused to do something or is predictable does
not mean that the offender was compelled to do the crime charged or is
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otherwise not responsible. Brain causation – or any other kind of causation – does not mean that we are automatons, not really acting agents at
all, or otherwise excused.
Most informed people are not “dualists” concerning the relation
between the mind and the brain. That is, they no longer think that our
minds – or souls – are independent of our brains and bodies more
generally and can somehow exert a causal inﬂuence over our bodies. It
may seem as if law’s emphasis on the importance of mental states as
causing behavior is based on a prescientiﬁc, outmoded form of dualism,
but this is not the case. Although the brain enables the mind, we have no
idea how this occurs and have no idea how action is possible. It is clear
that, at the least, mental states are dependent upon or supervene on brain
states, but neither neuroscience nor any other science has demonstrated
that mental states do not play an independent and partial causal role.
Simply because we now know that water is divisible into two hydrogen
and one oxygen atoms does not mean that it doesn’t have the property of
wetness that none of its component parts has individually. This is, of
course, the issue of emergence and reductionism in philosophy and
science. Applied to our context, even if mental states depend crucially
on brain states, mental states may have independent causal properties
that brain states alone may not have, and they may not be reducible to
brain states. These are immensely thorny issues and the responsibility
skeptics need to address them in detail rather than simply assume that
science has demonstrated that mental states are just brain states or that
mental states do no work.
Despite our lack of understanding of the mind–brain–action relation,
some scientists and philosophers question whether mental states have
any causal effect, thus treating mental states as “psychic appendixes” that
evolution has created but that have no genuine function. These claims
are not strawpersons. They are made by serious, thoughtful people (e.g.,
Greene & Cohen, 2006). As discussed below, if accepted, they would
create a complete and revolutionary paradigm shift in the law of criminal
responsibility and competence (and more widely). Thus, this claim is an
external critique and must be understood as such. Moreover, as the
section “The radical neurochallenge” suggests, given our current state
of knowledge, there is little scientiﬁc or conceptual reason to accept it
(Morse, 2011a).
The limits of neurolaw: the present limits of neuroscience
Most generally, the relation of brain, mind, and action is one of the
hardest problems in all science. Again, we have no idea how the brain
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enables the mind or how action is possible. The brain–mind–action
relation is a mystery, not in the sense that it depends on anything
magical, but simply in the sense that it is so difﬁcult to understand the
relation. For example, to return to the Wittgensteinian example raised
previously, we would like to know the difference between a neuromuscular spasm and intentionally moving one’s arm in exactly the same way.
The former is a purely mechanical motion, whereas the latter is an action,
but we cannot explain the difference between the two. We know that a
functioning brain is a necessary condition for having mental states and
for acting. After all, if your brain is dead, you have no mental states, are
not acting, and indeed are not doing much of anything at all. Still, we do
not know how mental states and action are caused.
Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and other neuroscientiﬁc methods, we still do not have sophisticated causal knowledge of
how the brain works generally, and we have little information that is
legally relevant. This is unsurprising. The scientiﬁc problems are fearsomely difﬁcult. Only in the last ﬁfteen years have researchers begun to
accumulate much data from functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), which is the technology that has generated most of the legal
interest. Moreover, virtually no studies have been performed to address
speciﬁcally legal questions.
Before turning to the speciﬁc reasons for neuromodesty, a few preliminary points of general applicability must be addressed. The ﬁrst
and most important is contained in the message of the prior section.
Causation by biological variables, including abnormal biological variables, does not per se create an excusing or mitigating condition. Any
excusing condition must be established independently. The goal is
always to translate the biological evidence into the criminal law’s folkpsychological criteria.
Assessing criminal responsibility involves a retrospective evaluation of
the defendant’s mental states at the time of the crime. No criminal wears
a portable scanner or other neurodetection device that provides a measurement at the time of the crime, at least not yet. Further, neuroscience is
insufﬁciently developed to detect speciﬁc, legally relevant mental content
or to provide a sufﬁciently accurate diagnostic marker for even a severe
mental disorder (Frances, 2009). Notably, the newest (ﬁfth) edition,of
the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) neither
contains any biological criterion nor identiﬁes any biomarker for mental
disorders with just a few exceptions (e.g., neurocognitive disorders).
Nonetheless, certain aspects of neural structure and function that bear
on legally relevant capacities, such as the capacity for rationality and
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control, may be temporally stable in general or in individual cases. If they
are, neuroevidence may permit a reasonably valid retrospective inference
about the defendant’s rational and control capacities and their impact on
criminal behavior. This will, of course, depend on the existence of
adequate science to do this. We currently lack such science, but future
research may provide the necessary data.
Questions concerning competence or predictions of future behavior
are based on a subject’s present condition. Thus, the problems besetting
the retrospective responsibility analysis do not apply to such issues. The
criteria for competence are functional. They ask whether the subject can
perform some task – such as understanding the nature of a criminal
proceeding or understanding a treatment option that is offered – at a
level the law considers normatively acceptable to warrant respecting the
subject’s choice and autonomy.
Now, let us consider the speciﬁc grounds for neuromodesty in cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience, the sub-disciplines most relevant to law. At present, most neuroscience studies on human beings
involve very small numbers of subjects, although this phenomenon is
starting to change. Most of the studies have been done on college and
university students, who are hardly a random sample of the population
generally and of criminal offenders speciﬁcally. There is also a serious
question of whether ﬁndings based on subjects’ behavior and brain
activity in a scanner would apply to real-world situations (the issue of
“ecological validity”). Further, most studies average the neurodata over
the subjects, and the average ﬁnding may not accurately describe the
brain structure or function of any actual subject in the study.
Replications are few, which is especially important for law. Policy and
adjudication should not be inﬂuenced by ﬁndings that are insufﬁciently
established, and replications of ﬁndings are crucial to our conﬁdence in
a result. Finally, the neuroscience of cognition and interpersonal behavior is largely in its infancy and what is known is quite coarse-grained
and correlational, rather than ﬁne-grained and causal (Miller, 2010).
What is being investigated is an association between a condition or a
task in the scanner and brain activity. These studies do not demonstrate
that the brain activity is a sensitive diagnostic marker for the condition
or either a necessary, sufﬁcient, or predisposing causal condition for the
behavioral task that is being done in the scanner. Any language that
suggests otherwise – such as claiming that some brain region is the
neural substrate for the behavior – is simply not justiﬁable based on the
methodology of most studies. Moreover, activity in the same region
may be associated with diametrically opposite behavioral phenomena –
for example, love and hate.
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There are also technical and research design difﬁculties. It takes many
mathematical transformations to get from the raw fMRI data to the
images of the brain that are increasingly familiar. Explaining these transformations is beyond me, but I do understand that the likelihood that an
investigator will ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant result depends on how the
researcher sets the threshold for signiﬁcance. There is dispute about this,
and the threshold levels are conventional. If the threshold changes, so
does the outcome. I have been convinced by neuroscience colleagues
that many such technical difﬁculties have largely been solved, but
research design and potentially unjustiﬁed inferences from the studies
are still an acute problem. It is extraordinarily difﬁcult to control for all
conceivable artifacts. Consequently, there are often problems of overinference. Finally, it is also an open question whether accurate inferences
or predictions about individuals are possible using group data when that
group includes the individual (Faigman et al., 2014). This is a very
controversial topic, but even if it is difﬁcult or impossible now, it may
become easier in the future. Over time, however, all these problems may
ease as imaging and other techniques become less expensive and more
accurate, research designs become more sophisticated, and the sophistication of the science increases generally.
Virtually all neuroscience studies of potential interest to the law involve
some behavior that has already been identiﬁed as of interest, and the
point of the study is to identify that behavior’s neural correlates. Neuroscientists do not go on general “ﬁshing” expeditions (but see Bennett
et al., 2009, for an amusing counterexample). There is usually some bit
of behavior – such as addiction, schizophrenia, or impulsivity – that
investigators would like to understand better by investigating its neural
correlates. To do this properly presupposes that the researchers have
already identiﬁed and validated the behavior under neuroscientiﬁc investigation. Thus, neurodata can be no more valid than the behavior with
which it is correlated.
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the behavior is not
well-characterized or is neurally indistinguishable from other, seemingly
different, behavior. In general, however, the existence of legally relevant
behavior will already be apparent before the neuroscientiﬁc investigation
is begun. For example, some people are grossly out of touch with reality.
If, as a result, they do not understand right from wrong, we excuse them
because they lack such knowledge. We might learn a great deal about the
neural correlates of such psychological abnormalities, but we already
knew without neuroscientic data that these abnormalities existed, and
we had a ﬁrm view of their normative signiﬁcance. In the future, however, we may learn more about the causal link between the brain and
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behavior, and studies may be devised that are more directly legally
relevant. I suspect that we are unlikely to make substantial progress with
neural assessment of legally relevant mental content, but we are likely to
learn more about capacities that will bear on excuse or mitigation. Again,
however, the neurodata must be genuinely and not rhetorically relevant
to the law’s folk-psychological criteria.
The criteria for both responsibility and competence are behavioral;
therefore, actions speak louder than images. This is a truism for all
criminal responsibility and competence assessments. If the ﬁnding of
any test or measurement of behavior is contradicted by actual behavioral evidence, then we must believe the behavioral evidence because it
is more direct and probative of the law’s behavioral criteria. For
example, if the person behaves rationally in a wide variety of circumstances, the agent is rational even if the brain appears structurally
or functionally abnormal. We also conﬁdently knew that some
people were behaviorally abnormal – such as being psychotic – long
before there were any psychological or neurological tests for such
abnormalities.
An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive. Suppose someone complains about back pain, a subjective symptom, and the question
is whether the subject actually does have back pain. We know that many
people with abnormal spines do not experience back pain, and many
people who complain of back pain have normal spines. If the person is
claiming a disability and the spine looks dreadful, evidence that the
person regularly exercises on a trampoline without difﬁculty indicates
that there is no disability caused by back pain. If there is reason to suspect
malingering, however, and there is not clear behavioral evidence of lack
of pain, then a completely normal spine might be of use in deciding
whether the claimant is malingering. Unless the correlation between the
image and the legally relevant behavior is very powerful, however, such
evidence will be of limited help.
If actions speak louder than images, however, what room is there for
introducing neuroevidence in legal cases? Is criminal law completely
immune to neuroscientiﬁc ﬁndings? Let us begin with cases in which
the behavioral evidence is clear and permits an equally clear inference
about the defendant’s mental state. For example, lay people may not
know the technical term to apply to people who are manifestly out of
touch with reality, but they will readily recognize this unfortunate condition. No further tests of any sort will be necessary to prove that the
subject suffers from seriously impaired rationality. In such cases, neuroevidence will be at most convergent and increase our conﬁdence in
what we already had conﬁdently concluded. Determining if it is worth
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collecting the neuroevidence will depend on whether the cost-beneﬁt
analysis justiﬁes obtaining convergent evidence.
Roper v. Simmons (2005) is the most striking example of a case in which
the behavioral evidence was clear. In Roper the United States Supreme
Court categorically excluded the death penalty for capital murderers who
killed when they were 16 or 17 years old on the grounds that adolescents
do not deserve the death penalty. The amicus briefs were replete with
neuroscience data showing that the brains of late adolescents are not fully
biologically mature, and advocates used this data to suggest that adolescent killers could not fairly be put to death. Now, we already knew from
common-sense observation and from rigorous behavioral studies that
juveniles are on average less rational than adults. What did the neuroscientiﬁc evidence about the juvenile brain add? It was consistent with the
undeniable behavioral data and perhaps provided a partial causal explanation of the behavioral differences. The neuroscience data was therefore
merely additive and only indirectly relevant, and the Supreme Court did
not cite it, except perhaps by implication when it referred vaguely to
“other” scientiﬁc evidence. In two later cases dealing with the punishment of juvenile offenders, Graham v. Florida (2010) and Miller v.
Alabama (2013), the Court did cite neuroscience in a general, conclusory
way, but I believe these cases were fully controlled by the reasoning in
Roper and that the use of neuroscience was dictum.
Whether adolescents are sufﬁciently less rational on average than
adults to exclude them categorically from the death penalty is a normative legal question and not a scientiﬁc or psychological question. Advocates claimed, however, that the neuroscience conﬁrmed that
adolescents are insufﬁciently responsible to be executed, thus confusing
the positive and the normative. The neuroscience evidence in no way
independently conﬁrms that adolescents are less responsible. If the
behavioral differences between adolescents and adults were slight, it
would not matter if their brains were quite different. Similarly, if the
behavioral differences were sufﬁcient for moral and constitutional differential treatment, then it would not matter if the brains were essentially
indistinguishable.
If the behavioral data are not clear, then the potential contribution of
neuroscience is large. Unfortunately, it is in just such cases that neuroscience at present is not likely to be of much help. I term the reason for
this the “clear cut” problem (Morse, 2011b). Recall that neuroscientiﬁc
studies usually start with clear cases of well-characterized behavior. In
such cases, the neural markers might be quite sensitive to the already
clearly identiﬁed behaviors precisely because the behavior is so clear.
Less clear behavior is simply not studied, or the overlap in data about less
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clear behavior is greater between experimental and control subjects.
Thus, the neural markers of clear cases will provide little guidance to
resolve behaviorally ambiguous cases of legally relevant behavior, and
they are unnecessary if the behavior is sufﬁciently clear
For example, suppose that in an insanity defense case the question is
whether the defendant suffers from a major mental disorder, such as
schizophrenia. In extreme cases, the behavior will be clear, and no
neurodata will be necessary. Investigators have discovered various small
but statistically signiﬁcant differences in neural structure or function
between people who are clearly suffering from schizophrenia and those
who are not. Although there is reason to be cautious about the validity of
such studies (Ioannidis, 2011), but let us assume the validity for purposes
of argument. In a behaviorally unclear case, however, the overlap
between data on the brains of people with schizophrenia and people
without the disorder is so great that a scan is insufﬁciently sensitive to
be used for diagnostic purposes. In short, at present, in those cases in
which the neuroscience would be most helpful, it has little to contribute.
Again, this situation may change if neural markers become more diagnostically sensitive for legally relevant criteria.
Some people think that executive capacity – the congeries of cognitive
and emotional capacities that help to plan and regulate human behavior –
is going to be the Holy Grail to help the law determine an offender’s true
culpability. After all, there is an attractive moral case that people with a
substantial lack of these capacities are less culpable, even if their conduct
satisﬁed the prima facie case for the crime charged. Perhaps neuroscience
can provide speciﬁc data previously unavailable to identify executive
capacity differences more precisely.
There are two problems, however. First, signiﬁcant problems with
executive capacity are readily apparent without testing, and criminal
law simply will not adopt ﬁne-grained culpability criteria. Second, the
correlation between neuropsychological tests of executive capacity and
actual real-world behavior is not terribly strong (Barkley & Murphy,
2010). Only a small fraction of the variance is accounted for, and the
scanning studies will use the types of tasks the tests use. Consequently,
we are far from able to use neuroscience accurately to assess non-obvious
executive capacity differences that are valid in real-world contexts.
The radical neurochallenge: are we victims of neuronal
circumstances?
This section addresses the claim and hope alluded to earlier that neuroscience will cause a paradigm shift in criminal responsibility by
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demonstrating that we are “merely victims of neuronal circumstances”
(or some similar claim that denies human agency). This claim holds that
we are not the kinds of intentional creatures we think we are. If our
mental states play no role in our behavior and are simply epiphenomenal,
then traditional notions of responsibility based on mental states and on
actions guided by mental states would be imperiled. But is the rich
explanatory apparatus of intentionality simply a post hoc rationalization
that the brains of hapless Homo sapiens construct to explain what their
brains have already done? Will the criminal justice system as we know it
wither away as an outmoded relic of a prescientiﬁc and cruel age? If so,
criminal law is not the only area of law in peril. What will be the fate of
contracts, for example, when a biological machine that was formerly
called a person claims that it should not be bound because it did not
make a contract? The contract is also simply the outcome of various
“neuronal circumstances.”
Given how little we know about the brain–mind and brain–action
connections, to claim that we should radically change our conceptions
of ourselves and our legal doctrines and practices based on neuroscience
is a form of neuroarrogance. Although I predict that in the future we will
see far more numerous attempts to use neuroscience in adjudication and
law reform, I have elsewhere argued that for conceptual and scientiﬁc
reasons, there is no reason at present to believe that we are not agents
(Morse, 2008a, 2011b, 2013a). It is possible that we are not agents, but
the current science does not remotely demonstrate that this is true. The
burden of persuasion is ﬁrmly on the proponents of the radical view.
What is more, the radical view entails no positive agenda. Suppose we
are convinced by the mechanistic view that we are not intentional,
rational agents after all. (Of course, the notion of being “convinced”
would be an illusion too. Being convinced means that we are persuaded
by evidence or argument, but a mechanism is not persuaded by anything.
A mechanism is simply neurophysically transformed.) What should we
do now? We know that it is an illusion to think that our deliberations and
intentions have any causal efﬁcacy in the world. We also know, however,
that we experience sensations – such as pleasure and pain – and care
about what happens to us and to the world. We cannot just sit quietly and
wait for our brains to activate, for determinism to happen. We must and
will deliberate and act.
Even if we still thought that the radical view was correct and standard
notions of genuine moral responsibility and desert were therefore impossible, we might still believe that the law would not necessarily have to give
up the concept of incentives. Indeed, Greene and Cohen (2006) concede
that we would have to keep punishing people for practical purposes.
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Such an account would be consistent with “black box” accounts of
economic incentives that simply depend on the relation between inputs
and outputs without considering the mind as a mediator between the
two. For those who believe that a thoroughly naturalized account of
human behavior entails complete consequentialism, this conclusion
might be welcomed.
On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same internal contradiction just explored. What is the nature of the agent that is discovering
the laws governing how incentives shape behavior? Could understanding
and providing incentives via social norms and legal rules simply be
epiphenomenal interpretations of what the brain has already done?
How do we decide which behaviors to reward or punish? What role does
reason – a property of thoughts and agents, not a property of brains – play
in this decision? And why would we call the intervention “punishment,”
a term that has immense normative connotation?
If the truth of pure mechanism is a premise in deciding what to do, no
particular moral, legal, or political conclusions follow from it (see Berman, 2008, which ﬁrst suggested this line of thought to me). The radical
view provides no guide as to how one should live or how one should
respond to the truth of reductive mechanism. Normativity depends on
reason and, thus, the radical view is normatively inert. If reasons do not
matter, then we have no reason to adopt any particular morals, politics or
legal rules, or to do anything at all.
Given what we know and have reason to do, the allegedly disappearing
person remains fully visible and necessarily continues to act for good
reasons, including the reasons currently to reject the radical view. We are
not Pinocchios, and our brains are not Geppettos pulling the strings.

The case for cautious neurolaw optimism

Despite having claimed that we should be exceptionally cautious about
the current contributions that neuroscience can make to criminal law
policy, doctrine, and adjudication, I am modestly optimistic about the
near and intermediate term contributions neuroscience can potentially
make to our ordinary, traditional, folk-psychological legal system. In
other words, neuroscience may make a positive contribution even though
there has been no paradigm shift in thinking about the nature of the
person and the criteria for criminal responsibility. The legal regime to
which neuroscience will contribute will continue to take people seriously
as people – as autonomous agents who may fairly be blamed and punished based on their mental states and actions.
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In general, my hope is that over time there will be feedback between
the folk-psychological criteria and the neuroscientiﬁc data. Each might
inform the other. Conceptual work on mental states might suggest new
neuroscientiﬁc studies, for example, and the neuroscientiﬁc studies
might help reﬁne the folk-psychological categories. The ultimate goal
would be a reﬂective, conceptual-empirical equilibrium.
More speciﬁcally, there are four types of situations in which neuroscience may be of assistance: (1) data indicating that the folk-psychological
assumption underlying a legal rule is incorrect, (2) data suggesting the
need for new or reformed legal doctrine, (3) evidence that helps adjudicate an individual case, and (4) data that help efﬁcient adjudication or
administration of criminal justice.
Many criminal law doctrines are based on folk-psychological assumptions about behavior that may prove to be incorrect. If so, the doctrine
should change. For example, it is commonly assumed that agents intend
the natural and probable consequences of their actions. In many or most
cases, it seems that they do, but neuroscience may help in the future to
demonstrate that this assumption is true far less frequently than we think.
In that case, the rebuttable presumption used to help the prosecution
prove intent should be softened or used with more caution.
Second, neuroscientiﬁc data may suggest the need for new or reformed
legal doctrine. For example, control tests for legal insanity have been
disfavored for some decades because they are ill understood and hard to
assess. It is at present impossible to distinguish “cannot” from “will not.”
Perhaps neuroscientiﬁc information will help to demonstrate and to
prove the existence of control difﬁculties that are independent of cognitive incapacities. If so, then perhaps independent control tests are justiﬁed and can be rationally assessed after all. More generally, perhaps a
larger percentage of offenders than we currently believe have such grave
control difﬁculties that they deserve a generic mitigation claim that is not
available in criminal law today. Neuroscience might help us discover that
fact. If that were true, justice would be served by adopting a generic
mitigating doctrine. On the other hand, if it turns out that such difﬁculties are not so common, we could be more conﬁdent of the justice of
current doctrine.
Third, neuroscience might provide data to help adjudicate individual
cases. Consider the insanity defense again. As in United States v. Hinckley
(1981), there is often dispute about whether a defendant claiming legal
insanity suffered from a mental disorder, which disorder the defendant
suffered from, and how severe the disorder was. At present, these questions must be resolved entirely behaviorally, and there is often room for
considerable disagreement about inferences drawn from the defendant’s
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actions, including utterances. In the future, neuroscience might help
resolve such questions if the clear-cut problem difﬁculty can be solved.
As mentioned previously, however, in the foreseeable future, I doubt that
neuroscience will be able to help identify the presence or absence of
speciﬁc mens reas.
Finally, neuroscience might help us to implement current policy more
efﬁciently. For example, the criminal justice system makes predictions
about future dangerous behavior for purposes of bail, sentencing, including capital sentencing, and parole. If we have already decided that it is
justiﬁed to use dangerousness predictions to make such decisions, it is
hard to imagine a rational argument for doing it less accurately if we are
in fact able to do it more accurately. Validated behavioral prediction
techniques already exist and should be used because they are more
accurate than pure clinical judgment (Skeem & Monahan, 2011). The
question is whether neuroscientiﬁc variables can add value by increasing
the accuracy of such predictions considering the cost of gathering such
data. Very recently, two studies have been published showing the potential usefulness of neural markers for enhancing the accuracy of predictions of antisocial conduct (Aharoni et al., 2013; Pardini et al., 2014).
Although these must be considered preliminary, “proof of concept”
studies, and a reanalysis of the Aharoni study demonstrated that the
increase in accuracy beyond the behavioral measures was very small
(Poldrack, 2013), it is perfectly plausible that in the future genuinely
valid, cost-beneﬁt justiﬁed neural markers will be identiﬁed, and thus,
prediction decisions will be more accurate and just.

PR

Responses to other chapters

Some of the chapters in this volume have addressed issues relevant to the
argument I have presented. At the editor’s suggestion, I will comment
brieﬂy on most of these chapters in light of the argument my chapter
presents. I will focus more heavily on Steven Hyman’s contribution,
which addresses arguments that I have made speciﬁcally. My focus is
on how one should think about the issues and about what the neuroscience contributes, if anything, to sensible resolution of them.
The central themes of my comments on all these chapters are, ﬁrst,
that they all deal with the folk-psychological concept of freedom rather
than the metaphysical debate (although some are not entirely clear about
the difference); second, the meanings of will and self-control are unsettled in both philosophy and science; and, third, neuroscience is unlikely
in the near future to play a large role in resolving questions concerning
folk-psychological freedom, the will, self-control, and responsibility.
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Let us begin with the interesting contribution by de Haan et al. on the
phenomenology of obsessive-compulsive disorder and what it teaches us
about freedom of the will. The chapter is a contribution to the folkpsychological concept of freedom and not to the metaphysical debate.
The metaphysical debate is all or none: either we have libertarian freedom or we don’t as a result of how the universe “really is.” How much
conscious control – the authors’ term – we have over our actions (and
thoughts) is a folk-psychological issue. Conscious control is almost surely
distributed on a continuum and how much we would need to be responsible is a normative question. Relatedly, I do not believe that neuroscience has demonstrated any worrisome limits on what we can consciously
control if we have reason to exercise that control and no other excusing
or mitigating condition is present.
The chapter’s most general claim is that the extreme conscious control
that sufferers from OCD exercise paradoxically diminishes their sense of
agency and experience of freedom. But having such subjective selfimpressions is a different issue from whether and how their freedom is
in fact impaired. As I freely concede, genuine compulsion clearly diminishes freedom and people with OCD say that they are compelled to think
certain thoughts or to do certain deeds. But “compelled” is a normative
conclusion because OCD sufferers are not literally compelled. Suppose
that a person whose major sign of OCD is compulsive handwashing were
threatened with death if they yielded to a particular desire to wash. My
hunch is that they wouldn’t wash and thus that they could bring the
action, although presumably not the desire, under conscious control if
they had a good enough reason to exercise it. For all we know, it might be
“easy” to control the impulse under these cruel conditions or it might be
supremely difﬁcult, but the action would be controlled. In most cases,
however, we have very little valid, objective knowledge of how much
conscious control an OCD sufferer has over his or her behavioral signs.
Moreover, OCD sufferers are a heterogeneous lot. Are they compelled
because the desire is so strong, the control mechanisms so weak, the
motivation to control is lacking, or some combination of the three. It is
almost impossible to tease out these variables independently and almost
certainly the mix varies substantially among those with the disorder.
An interesting question is how much conscious control we could fairly
expect OCD sufferers to have under what circumstances. In the
following three examples, hold constant the intensity of the OCD.
Imagine that a “compulsive” handwasher is with his or her spouse. They
are enjoying quality time together – say, watching a television show they
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both like – when he gets up to wash, thus disrupting the quality time.
Now, imagine that they are having the “make it or break it conversation”
about potentially ending the marriage. In the midst of this intense discussion, he gets up to wash, interrupting his spouse in the midst of an
important issue. In the third example, they are having dinner together
and a chicken bone becomes lodged in her esophagus and threatens to
asphyxiate her. The handwasher knows the Heimlich maneuver but gets
up to wash and she dies. Remember: hold everything about the disorder
and the sufferer otherwise constant. I think we would have a very different set of reactions. In the ﬁrst case, the spouse would be disappointed
but forgiving. In the second, the spouse might be genuinely indignant. In
the third, we would expect much more from the handwasher and might
indeed morally and legally condemn him for failing to exercise a capacity
he should have exercised, albeit it would have been very hard for him to
do so.
My preference is to treat impulse control problems as rationality
problems. For the OCD sufferers, the intrusiveness of unwanted
thoughts or the urgency of unwanted, strong desires interferes with their
ability to bring reason to bear. In fact, in my view, this is the best
explanation for “self-control” problems in most cases, but I am special
pleading.
A last general observation about this chapter is a question about how
far we can generalize about conscious control based on an analysis of the
folk-psychological phenomenology of people with OCD.
Foquaert et al.

PR

I have little to say about the excellent psychopathy chapter that uses a
reasons-responsive model pioneered by Fischer and Ravizza to consider
whether psychopaths should be held morally and legally responsible.
This model is very close to the one I proposed in the main part of this
chapter and therefore is a contribution to the folk-psychological conception of freedom rather than to the metaphysical debate.
In the chapter’s introduction, they do imply that new discoveries about
the neuroscience and genetics of psychopathy cast doubt on free will, but
this is not true about either the metaphysical or the folk-psychological/
compatibilist view. The metaphysical debate is, well, metaphysical,
and scientiﬁc discoveries are not going to prove or disprove that we
have libertarian freedom. As I said in the main body of my chapter,
neurodeterminism or genodeterminism are simply the newest kids on
the incompatibilist block. Nor will such discoveries cast doubt on the
folk-psychological account of freedom and responsibility. We now have
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genetic and neuroscientiﬁc understanding of psychopathy because the
condition was already well-characterized behaviorally and it is the behavior – mental states and actions – that are crucial for assessing freedom
and responsibility. We know that some psychopaths totally lack empathy
and conscience. Whether this should be a responsibility diminishing
condition because it is a type of rational incapacity that bears on responsibility is a normative, not a scientiﬁc, question. And, since actions speak
louder than images, even if we cannot ﬁnd the neural correlates of
empathy or its lack, we must believe the behavioral evidence.
For the record, I do argue elsewhere in agreement with this chapter
that the psychological features of psychopathy, including lack of genuine
moral sense, conscience, and empathy, should be responsibility diminishing because psychopaths lack rational moral agency (Morse, 2008b).
These functional incapacities are doing the moral work, whether or not
they are signs or symptoms of a disorder. Simply ﬁnding neural or
genetic correlates or even causes for these incapacities does not entail
that the condition is a disease. All behavior has brain and genetic causes.
Although I believe that psychopathy is best characterized as a mental
disorder and not a bad moral character, the moral argument is not
hostage to a disease model and thus is not undermined by those who
claim psychopathy is not a disorder. Even if it is not, some people have
these functional incapacities through no fault of their own, and I believe
their responsibility should be mitigated or excused if they commit
immoral acts.
Meynen

PR

This chapter is concerned with the question of how mental disorder
affects the will. Although it gestures at the metaphysical problem, it is
really a contribution to the folk-psychological account because if we
don’t have libertarian freedom, we don’t, and no speciﬁc condition such
as mental disorder affects this outcome. The chapter also claims that it is
a matter of debate whether “free will has to do with criminal responsibility,” but, with respect, it is not a matter of debate at the doctrinal level
because libertarian freedom or its lack is not a criterion of any criminal
law doctrine. At the most, one can argue that this type of freedom is
foundational, but as the main body of the chapter demonstrates, criminal
responsibility doctrines and practices are fully consistent with the truth of
determinism.
The chapter’s main difﬁculty is that it fails to provide an adequate
conceptual or empirical account of what the will is. But this is a notoriously difﬁcult problem in the philosophy of mind and action. Still more
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clarity on this point would have aided a reader’s engagement with the
arguments. In any case, the concept of the will envisioned is folkpsychological, and not a reduced neurophysiological mechanism. Of
course, depression can make a sufferer generally avolitional, but speciﬁying how this is different from not forming a desire in the ﬁrst place is
important.
Most of the examples the chapter uses to show how mental disorder
can affect responsibility involve problems with rationality, e.g., psychosis,
failure to integrate information in patients with delirium, alteration of
decision-making rationality among some drug addicts. If the will is
treated as an executory capacity – a volition in Michael Moore’s terms
(Moore, 1993), then a psychotic person who acts in response to his or her
delusional beliefs or in response to a hallucination or who yields to a
compulsive desire has a fully functioning will that executes their intentions (Fingarette & Hasse, 1979). The problem is not the will; it is
rational capacity. If one wants to talk about failures of self-control, then
the folk-psychological process by which this occurs needs to be speciﬁed.
Saying that the person’s will was undermined is simply a deﬁnitional stop
that doesn’t explain why the person “cannot” as opposed to “will not”
control himself when there is apparently good reason to do so, as in cases
of addiction. When the noted addiction researcher, Nora Volkow, whom
the chapter quotes, claims that changes in the addict’s brain undermine
free will, what she is really referring to is the rationality of folkpsychological decision-making. One could do the same type of analysis
with virtually all the clinical conditions the chapter reviews.
Most psychiatric conditions do not deprive the agent of the choice of
how to act. People who experience command hallucinations do not have
to obey them, and if they do, the will executes their intention very well.
Suppose someone heard a voice tell them to commit a mass murder?
How do we know that they could not but obey? If they complied, then the
excusing condition would be lack of rational capacity, not a problem with
the will. Even the absence of genuine choice does mean an action is
necessarily “unfree.” When Martin Luther said, “Here I stand; I can do
no other,” it was true that he believed he had no option and that tacking
the theses to the church door was nonetheless a magniﬁcent exercise of
freedom. There was no lack of rational capacity and no normative
compulsion.
I understand why coercion and manipulation may be excusing conditions, but it is unclear why not being “oneself” should also excuse or why
any of these is a problem of the will. The chapter uses the example of a
hypomanic person who is different from who he or she is when not in the
hypomanic state. I applaud this example because I have written,
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including in the main body of this chapter, about the hypomanic armed
robber in which the psychiatric condition plays a but-for role in producing armed robbery. Again, there is no problem with executory intentions, and I suggest that rational incapacity is doing the excusing work if
it should be done at all. After all, many people do things “out of character” when they are stressed or the like, but we would not excuse them for
wrongful behavior unless they became functionally impaired. It is the
functional impairment that is crucial.
Hall & Carter
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This chapter concerning the responsibility of addicts, by two distinguished addiction researchers, accurately covers the debate between
those who claim that addiction is a chronic and relapsing brain disease
and those who claim that it is best understood as a condition marked by
voluntary but difﬁcult choices. It also usefully surveys the literature on
whether involuntary treatment for addiction is justiﬁed. I have written
extensively on the question of the responsibility of addicts for actions
related to their addiction (Morse, 2000, 2011c, 2013c) and wish in this
brief comment to address only problems related to the central themes of
this volume.
This chapter is once again addressed to the folk-psychological conception of freedom and responsibility, but it blurs the distinction between
the metaphysical and the folk-psychological accounts by referring to the
views of leading “voluntarists” such as Gene Heyman and Herbert
Fingarette as “libertarian.” This seems to suggest that these writers have
a position requiring libertarian freedom in the metaphysical debate, but
this is not true. Neither enters the metaphysical jousting. Their analyses
are ﬁrmly folk-psychological, suggesting only that addicts do have the
capacity to make uncompelled decisions in the folk-psychological sense
about whether and how much to use substances and they are not “slaves”
to their addictive desires to use substances. Neither relies on a metaphysical libertarianism.
The chapter is straightforwardly concerned with folk-psychological
responsibility, so the folk-psychological facts about addicts are important. If addicts lack rational capacities or have control difﬁculties, they
may seem less responsible than if these characterizations are false.
Heyman’s book on addiction (2009) pointed out that the epidemiological
evidence about remission from addiction without treatment is inconsistent with the brain disease model of addiction. The vast majority of
addicts simply stop using substances and no longer meet the criteria for
addiction, albeit often after failed attempts, when they have a subjectively
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good enough reason to do so. The ﬁndings were criticized on numerous
grounds, but Heyman effectively answered his critics in a more recent
reanalysis (2013). His ﬁndings stand.
It is true that many addicts ruin their lives and the lives of others they
profess to care about and that they have had multiple failed attempts to
quit. The inference is that they are unable to quit, a conclusion bolstered
by the neuroscientiﬁc ﬁnding that the reward circuits in addicts are
negatively altered and by self-report that they can’t help themselves.
The problem, however, is that the studies of relapse and the neuroscientiﬁc studies are all done on addicts who are in treatment for addiction,
and these addicts are not a representative sample of addicts. They are
disproportionately co-morbid. That is, they suffer from other mental
disorders as well as addiction, and it is impossible to know from this
sample of addicts whether relapse is a product of addiction alone, the
other disorder, or an interactive combination of the two.
The relation between addiction and responsibility is extremely complicated on any account, and it may vary according to the actions an
addict performs. As Steven Hyman notes in an article the chapter
quotes, addicts are not automatons. They are acting people. For
example, one might argue that there is a more justiﬁable theory for
mitigation and excuse for possession for personal use than for committing serious crimes against others to obtain the money needed to buy
the substances. The reasons to forgo the latter crimes are much
stronger than the reasons to forgo personal use, and addicts are responsive to reason. Rates of use and addiction vary with availability
and price.
I believe that it is often the case that addicts cannot be adequately
guided by reason at moments of peak desire when they can think of
virtually nothing else except satisfying their desires. This may be especially true when their illegal actions are simply purchase or possession
for personal use, when other-regarding reasons to abstain may be less
strong. This is a rationality problem, which is a classic mitigating or
excusing condition, and I ﬁnd it very attractive. Nonetheless, the case
for mitigation and excuse founders on the shoals of diachronous
responsibility. When addicts are quiescent and not assaulted by persistent, intense urges, they are capable of rational thought unless their
rational capacities are disabled for some other reason. At that point,
they are capable of taking the steps necessary to avoid future trouble
when they are in the state of peak desire again. The addict’s selfassurance that he won’t use today or anymore can only work a few
times before the “denial” excuse can no longer obtain. He will have to
take stronger steps to avoid trouble, and if he doesn’t, he will be
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responsible for what he irrationally does later because he was responsible for failing to take those steps when he was capable of rational
action.
Hyman
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If I understand it correctly, this chapter suggests that science has demonstrated that agency is an illusion, but that this illusion is so central to
our experienced lives that it cannot be abandoned. It recommends that
we adopt “double vision,” recognizing when we are in the lab that agency
is an illusion, but ignoring this hard fact when we are outside the lab. It
suggests that we do this without resorting to the comforts of compatibilism, which is treated as a sleight of hand. Thus, the chapter claims both
that science has demonstrated that we do not have libertarian freedom
and that we really are not agents who act for and can be guided by
reasons. I fully agree that libertarian freedom is theoretically impossible,
although science has not proven that this is so.
As is apparent from the main body of the chapter, however, I ﬁrmly
disagree with the claims that compatibilism is a sleight of hand and that
agency is an illusion. As Vargas argues (2013), rejecting compatibilism
requires a lot of very hard philosophical work; it simply cannot be waved
away. Indeed, the metaphysical arguments in its favor become ever more
nuanced and sophisticated (e.g., Vihvelin, 2013). I concede that the truth
of compatibilism has not been conclusively demonstrated – and cannot
be – but it is the dominant view of experts in the ﬁeld who are wellacquainted with the scientiﬁc worldview and with the empirical advances
in biology and other sciences relevant to human behavior. Now, any
writer is entitled to reject compatibilism as an asserted premise, but that
isn’t an argument. It is not contracausal freedom that is “saved” by
compatibilism, as the chapter incorrectly suggests. What is saved is the
possibility of robust responsibility as long as it is true that people have
agency.
The chapter is on ﬁrmer argumentative ground in denying the truth of
agency, but the science doesn’t remotely support this assertion and it
denies common sense. Perhaps we all truly are mere victims of neuronal
circumstances, as Greene and Cohen assert (2006) but do not prove (and
why is the neuronal level of explanation the right one if one is being
reductionist?). But given common sense and the importance of agency to
experienced living, the burden of persuasion is clearly on the agencyskeptics and they haven’t begun to meet it. It seems to me that the more
sensible scientiﬁc stance towards agency is to try to explain how it is
possible rather than to explain it away reductionistically. After all, to
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date, the inter-theoretic reductionist project has been a dismal failure,
even in the allegedly easiest cases such as the reduction of chemistry to
physics. And, again, why should the biological level be the most sensible
reduction? Why isn’t everything reducible to physics? Why is there a ﬁeld
of chemistry or biology? If the answer is that the biological level is the
most explanatory and useful to explain human behavior, then it’s not
reduction that is doing the work, but a pragmatic argument about levels
of explanation. In that case, it is an open empirical and conceptual
questions about which level of explanation is the most valuable for any
particular phenomenon.
The chapter’s section on punishment misconstrues retributivism.
Although it may have its “evolutionary” roots in the expression of moral
outrage and the suppression of free riding (Oldenquist, 1988), retributivism is fundamentally a theory of deontological justice. It is good in itself
to give people what they deserve. Numerous studies, some of which the
chapter cites, conﬁrm that people are “instinctive” retributivists, but
retributive theorists can take scant comfort from this because it does
not provide a theoretical, normative justiﬁcation. “Instincts” may be
erroneous or undesirable. Further, it is not clear that ordinary people
are metaphysical libertarians who believe that blame and punishment are
foundationally based on strong free will. Most people have no clear
understanding of what they mean by free will, including many educated
people such as lawyers and judges.
The chapter is correct to conclude, however, that moral judgment is
central to our lives and consistent with what we know neurobiologically
and psychologically. Indeed, this conclusion seems inconsistent with the
prior claim that agency is an illusion.
The section of the chapter devoted to neurobiology and the law ﬂatteringly uses my work as an exemplar for the position that at present neuroscience has little to add to adjudication of criminal responsibility and legal
policy. This section is admirably cautious about how much we know today
that is legally relevant, and it properly recognizes the importance of genuine
blaming doctrines and practices within the criminal law if justice is to be
done. The underlying assumption, however, is that the increasing discovery of biological causal mechanisms is inconsistent with agency and at some
point will cause our sense of agency to wither away, although not just yet.
But this assumption raises the question of what science will demonstrate. If
my claim is correct that the task of science is to explain how genuine agency
is possible, then the discoveries of science may reinforce our sense of
agency and the moral and legal practices that ﬂow therefrom.
The chapter misreads my position to some degree. I do think that
current doctrine and practice is consistent with the ﬁndings of
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neuroscience (and other sciences), but I do not think that legal doctrine
and practice are insulated from the causal understanding science produces. As I have argued repeatedly in my writings, if science indicates
that factual premises used in our moral and legal responsibility ascriptions are false, then the doctrines and practices should change. Moreover, neuroscience and other sciences might help us better characterize
the folk-psychological capacities relevant to responsibility. Recall that in
the main body of the chapter and in many previous writings, I argued for
an interactive process between the psychological and biological realms of
explanation to help reﬁne both and to achieve a conceptual-empirical
equilibrium. Thus, I agree with the chapter in this regard. But responsibility is about actions and mental states, so the science will have to
demonstrate, for example, that offenders in individual cases do not have
the agentic capacities we may otherwise think they have or that people in
general do not have certain capacities crucial to current responsibility
ascriptions. If this occurs, the science will help the law become more just
in individual cases and more generally.
Contra the chapter’s assertion, my position does not secretly adopt
dualism to wall off responsibility practices from science. I do assume that
mental states play a partial but crucial role in explaining human action
and that mental states are enabled by the brain in interaction with the
environment (Noe, 2009), although at present we have almost no idea
how this happens. Science is of course relevant to legal doctrine and
practice, but only if it teaches us something about the acting human
person. Mental states and actions are the stuff of responsibility and
actions speak louder than images.
Of course the criminal law should pay the closest attention to the new,
causal discoveries being made by many of the mechanistic sciences, such
as neuroscience, but discovering causes does not entail that we are not
agents as the chapter seems to suggest (and most of what we know
neuroscientiﬁcally about behavior is correlational, not causal). Once
again, until and unless science demonstrates that we do not have the
agentic capacities we are fully entitled to believe we have, criminal
responsibility doctrines and practices have a ﬁrm foundation without
any magical assumptions being made.
Conclusion
At present, neuroscience has little to contribute to more just and accurate
criminal law decision-making concerning policy, doctrine, and individual case adjudication. This was the conclusion reached when I tentatively
identiﬁed “Brain Overclaim Syndrome” eight years ago, and it remains
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true today. In the future, however, as the philosophies of mind and
action, and neuroscience mutually mature and inform one another,
neuroscience will help us understand criminal behavior. Although no
radical transformation of criminal justice is likely to occur, neuroscience
can inform criminal justice as long as it is relevant to law and translated
into the law’s folk-psychological framework and criteria.
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